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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARA OTTESON and NELLIE A.
OTTESON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
RICHARD D. MALONE and HILA
SUE MALONE, husband and wife,
Case No. 15478
Appellants-Defendants.
RESPONDENTS BRIEF
~TATEMENT

OF THE NATURE

OF THE CASE

This case is an appeal from that portion of the judgment
entered by the trial

co~rt

denying Appellants' demand for

specific performance of the option portion of a "Lease and
Option'' and that portion of the trial court's judgment
declaring void the option portion of the "Lease and Option."
Appellants also appeal from the order denying their Motion
for New Trial and Alternative MOtion to Amend the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Edward
Sheya, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Emery
County on the 7th and 8th of December, 1976.

The Respondents

had filed suit against the Appellants for, among other things,
relief from the option portion of the "Lease and Option" executed
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by the Appellants and Respondents and the Appellants had
counterclaimed for specific performance of the option portion
of the

11

Lease and Option,

11

The court denied Appellants' moticr

for specific performance and granted Respondents' plea by
declaring void the option portion of the "Lease and Option".
Appellants moved the trial court for a new trial and in the
alternative for amendment of the Findgings, Conclusions and
Judgment.

These motions were denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek judgment declaring their option to
purchase valid and granting their request for specific performance of said option,

Respondents seek affirmation of

the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and rulings
of the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 27th, 1974 a document entitled ''Lease and Option"
was executed by the Appellants and the- Respondents.
Exhibit B),

(Complaint

The document purports to grant to the Appellants

a five year lease of 28 acres belonging to Respondents.

In

addition the document contains an option to purchase same said
28 acres,
·

A dispute arose between the parties as to the meaning,

eff:

·

and validity of the contract, a suit was filed by the Respondent
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alleging breach of the agreement and asking relief from the
option, and an answer and counterclaim asking for specific
performance of the option was filed by the Appellants.

The

Respondents requested a jury trial on April 22, 1976 which
the Appellants vigorously opposed by motion and rremorandwn.
The trial court, as a result of Appellants opposition, denied
Respondents demand for jury trial.

The case came for trial

before the Honorable Edward Sheya, District Judge, sitting without a jury, on the 7th and 8th of December, 1976.

The court

made the following findings based upon the testimony of Ara
Otteson, Richard D. Malone, Hila Sue Malone, Boyd Bunnell
and the deposition of Nellie A. Otteson, which was admitted
in lieu of her attendance at trial due to disability and
doctors prohibition:
1.

The Court found in its Findings of Fact and Con-

clusions of Law beginning with the second paragraph on page
3 as follows:
a.
That the plaintiff, Ara Otteson is aged, but
appears to be in good health and of sound and di~posing
memory, he having testified before the court during the
course of the trial. From the evidence it appears that
Nellie A. Otteson, the wife of the plaintiff Ara Otteson,
is infirm and at the time of trial was totally unable to
attend the trial do to sickness, disability, age and doctors
prohibition.
b,
That the defendant Richard D. Malone and Hila
Sue Malone appear to be youthful in comparison to plaintiffs
and of normal intelligence.
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I

c.
That the home of the plaintiffs lie upon the la:,:ll
which is subject to the plaintiffs third cause of
action, the plaintiff Ara Otteson, having farmed it
with his father as a boy and having been a farmer on
the said land his entire lifetime, that olaintiff
Ara Otteson has supported and sustained himself and
his family over the years by raising crops and animals
upon said land.
d.
That in the year of 1972 or 1973, the defendan+-'
in a real estate purchase agreement, purchased from pla 1 ~'.'
tiffs, ten acres of land without water, and on June 27th
1974, the defendants prevailed upon plaintiffs to lease'
the balance of the acreage which was irrigated land with
water rights to the defendants, and that after considerabld
discussion of the subject by the parties, the plaintiffs
did agree orally, to enter into a lease of the land and
water rights which had not been sold by plaintiffs to
defendants; which said land and water rights, located
in Emery County, State of Utah, is more particularly
described as follows:
(description of 28 acres omitted)

j

e.
That the plaintiff Ara Otteson, and the defendar·
Hila Sue Malone, prior to having the lease reduced to writ
drove in the said defendants automobile from Huntington to
Price City for purpose of reviewing the con tents of the pre·
posed lease. The plaintiff, Nellie A. Otteson, was unabl;J
due to physical disability to go to the meeting at the 0L1
of Mr. Bunnell, attorney of Price City, nor did the
·
defendant, Richard D, Malone, go to the meeting with
the attorney Mr. Bunnell.
On the way to the meeting
with the attorney, Mr. Otteson discovered that the
batteries in his hearing aids were dead, and when his
hearing aid batteries are dead, he is almost totally
unable to hear sound or conversation.
During the
meeting with the attorney, Mr Otteson was unable to
hear any of the discussion or to participate in any of
the conversation between the defendant Hila Sue Malone
and Mr. Bunnell.
The attorney Bunnell testified at the
trial that he thought that there was something wrong
with Ara Otteson, and he, the attorney, thought perhaps
Mr. Otteson had a stroke because he "acted strange at
the meeting" which had been arranged by the plaintiff
Ara Otteson's wife Nellie A. Otteson, by telephone.
f,
That Ara Otteson heard none of the discussion
at the meeting relative to the preparation of the lease
between attorney Bunnell and the defendant Hila sue f e
Malone, and at no time during said conference, or be or
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the conference with attorney Bunnell, did either Ara
Otteson or Nellie A. Otteson, his wife, talk or discuss
any terms, or even the subject of an option to purchase
the real estate, either at attorneys Bunnell's office,
or on any other occasion.
g.
Sometime after the meeting in attorney Bunnell's
office above-described, the attorney sent a copy of a lease
he had drafted on the subject property to the olaintiffs.
The plaintiff Ottesons reviewed the lease and it appeared to
be substantially correct, except there was reference to an
option to buy which the plaintiffs concluded meant, since
they had never discussed any privilege or right in the
defendants to buy the said acreage, that in the event
they decided to sell said real estate, that the Malones,
defendants, would have first right of refusal to buy
the property,
Since the plaintiffs did not intend to
sell the said acreage, they did not consider the "option
to buy", which they interpreted to be a first right of
refusal in the event they, in their sole judgment,
determined to sell the said property, of any consequence.
h.
Subsequently, they had one or more discussions
regarding the lease with the Malones, and at no time did
the defendants Malones, ever mention either the option to
buy or the meaning of the option to buy, which had been
inserted in the lease without either the permission or
advanced knowledge of the plaintiffs.
i.
That it was not until subsequent to a notice
served upon plaintiffs by defendants indicating that
the defendant intended to exercise the said option to
buy the said real estate, that plaintiffs Ottesons
realized their mistake and failure to appreciate the
meaning, significance and effect of the words "option
to buy" which were inserted in the lease by attorney
Bunnell at the direction of defendant Hila Sue Malone.
j.
That the evidence indicates that the plaintiff
Ara Otteson thought and believed that the option meant
that he nevertheless had the right to determine at some
later time whether or not the property should be sold, and
that only in such event, that he thereafter decided to sell
the property, would the defendants have the right of first
refusal to buy the said property.
k.

Further, plaintiffs, in fact, told the defendants

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prior to signing the lease, that they would not, under
any circumstances, sell the subject land, and at no time
did they discuss with the defendants or attorney Bunnell
an option to buy the said property.

i

1.
That defendants have not kept the terms of the
lease in that they have failed to pay lease payments as du'
water assessment charges due, and property taxes defendant:'
were requested to pay by terms of the lease.
2.

The court in its memorandum decision beginning

at the top of page twelve stated as follows:
The court is not clearly satisfied from a preponderance of the evidence that said option embodies
the real understanding of the parties, and especially
of the plaintiff Ara Otteson.
The other plaintiff,
Nellie A. Otteson, was )Jy reason of illness and infirmity,
unable to attend the trial, and therefore, the court does I
not have the benefit of her testimony.
I
By reason of the circumstances under which the option I
was executed, the court is doubtful that the significance c:I
effect thereof was understood by plaintiffs, and especialli·
the plaintiff Ara Otteson.
The evidence indicates that pla:
tiff Ara Otteson thought that the option meant that he sti::,
had the right to determine later whether or not the propert1
should be sold, and only in the event that he thereafter
decided to sell the property, would the defendants have be;
right of first refusal.
Plaintiff Ara Otteson stated he ~ 1 1
his wife told the Mal ones they wouldn't sell the land and.
did not discuss the option in the form it appears in the 1"1
1

Appellant challenged the courts finding of fact by motion

~o ~4

irii
20th day I

and a motion for new trial which was schedule for hearing in
County on the 20th of September, 1977.

On Tuesday, the

September, at the time of hearing, counsel for the Appellant wa: II
not present at the hearing.

The court after considering the

matter, denied Appellants motion in all its aspects.
Appellant being disatisfied with the trial courts decisior,
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i
11

thereafter pursued this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ABUSE ITS DESCRETION IN
DENYING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE TO THE APPELLANTS ON
THEIR COUNTERCLAIM,
The Appellants, in this Appeal, take exception with two
rulings of the lower court; the voiding of the option portion
of the "Lease and Option", and the denial of Appellant's request
for specific performance of the option portion of the agreement.
The Appellants in the body of their argument have failed to
clearly address the different issues presented by these two
separate rulings, but rather have lumped the reformation/
rescission theories and cases with specific performance
theories and cases,

Respondents will hereinafter focus

on the court's denial of specific performance believing
that the Appellant has not properly treated the law with
respect to that ruling.

1

·1

I

The granting or denying of a bill of specific performance involves a necessarily fact intensive decision
making process on the part of a trial court.

As such,

the trial court is given a reasonable amount of latitude
by courts of appeals which may be couched in terms of

"Judicial Discretion", "Sound Discretion", and the like.
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Professor Corbin in his work on contracts at Specific
Performance, section 1136 discusses the problem of the
trial court in weighing the numerous factual and legal
considerations that may be involved in passing judgment
on a petition for Specific Performance and stated at
Volume 5 A Page 95 as follows:
The solving of these problems may require
the weighing of conflicting evidence, and in the
end may depend upon matters of opinion that are
not capable of obvious demonstration.
It is in
these respects that the court has more "discretion"
in a suit for specific performance than in an
action for damages,
The matters to be considered and the amount of discretion
allowed a trial court in its considerationnof a petition for
Specific Performance are different from the considerations
and discretion involved in an action for rescission or cancela·
tion.

Again Professor Corbin, at Specific Performance

Section 1136 page 96 states:
While it is going to far to say that granting
or refusing of a decree is wholly in the discretion
of the trial court, it is true that, in determining
the question, a greater variety of facts is to be
taken into consideration than is the case in an
action for damages for breach of contract....
.
Among these facts are the public interest, oppression
and sharp practice in the formation of a contract,
inadequacy of consideration, mistake even though
unilateral in character, hardship that will be
caused by enforcement, the plaintiffs own breach
or inequitable conduct.
These and other facts,
either singly or in combination may be sufficient
to justify a refusal of specific enforcement even
though they would not be sufficient to constitute
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a defe~se t~ an action for damages or even justify
an affirmative decree for rescission or cancelation.
This principle of judicial discretion is also well
recognized by the Utah Court.
449, 88 P. 407,

In Free vs. Little, 31 Utah

(1907) and again in McNeil vs. McNeil, 61 Utah

141, 211 P. 988 (1922) the Utah Supreme Court Stated as follows:
The right to specific performance depends not
upon hard fast rules according to which all cases
are to be_ decided, but each case is dependent upon
its own peculiar facts and circumstances. While the
right is to be governed by general rules and principles
of equity, each case, nevertheless, must be determined
upon its own inheritant equities.
After a court of equity has exercised its discretion
the high court, in reviewing such a decision, should view
it with considerable deference.
P.2d, 700

In Barber vs. Calder, 522

(1974), the Utah Supreme Court sets forth the

standard of review

in discretionary matters:

In situations where the exercise of discretion is
appropriate, considerable weight should be given to the
determination of the trial court, whichever way it goes.
This is true, because due to his close involvement with
the parties, the witnesses and the total circumstances
of the case, he is in the best position to judge what
the interests of justice require in safeguarding the
rights and interests of all parties concerned.
The following are elements of this case upon which the trial
court's denial of specific enforcement can properly be based:

1.

The significance and effect of the option as executed

-9-
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was not understood by the Ottesons.
The trial court, by its affirmative findings of fact
and statement of the law in its memorandum decision makes
it clear that it considered the Ottesons' misapprehension
of the meaning and effect of the option as being of primary
significance in its denial of specific performance.

The

court, in its memorandum decision beginning at the top
of page two stated as follows:
The court is not clearly satisfied from a preponderance of the evidence that said option embodies
the real understanding of the parties, and especially
of plaintiff Ara Otteson.
The other plaintiff Nellie
A, Otteson was by reason of illness and infirmity unable to attend the trial, and therefore, the Court
does not have benefit of her testimony.
_
By reason of the circumstances by which the
option was executed, the Court is doubtful that
the significance or effect thereof was understood
by the plaintiffs, and especially the plaintiff
Ara Otteson. The evidence indicates that plaintiff
Ara Otteson thought that the option meant he still
had the right to determine later whether or not
the property should be sold, and only in the event
that he thereafter decided to sell the property
would the defendants have the right of first
refusal, Plaintiff Ara Otteson stated he and his
wife told Malones they wouldn't sell the land and
did not discuss the option in the form it appeared
in the lease,
In 71 Am Jur 2d Pages 79, 80, 81, Sections 53
and 54, the author states, as far as the court deems
it applicable to the facts of this case as follows:

- 10-
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"Inasmuch as specific performance
will not be granted unless it is in
accordance with equity and good conscience,
it is well settled that equity may properly
and generally refuse to issue a decree of
specific performance to compel a defendant
to perform a contract which he entered into
under mistake in which he would not have
entered into had he understood its true effect
_§£ecific performance not being a matter of
absolute right, equity will refuse to enforce its performance when not clearly
satisfied that it embodies the real understanding of the parties. Where the circumstances under which the contract was executed
render it doubtful whether the act was understood by the defendant, the Court is justified
in refusing specific performance. Thus in
an apppropriate case, a unilateral mistake may
justify a court of equity in refusing specific
performance . . • • , . . •
. . . • . • . . • • Neither is actual
fraud or intention to defraud necessary
to defeat the plaintiff's claim for
specific performance,
It is sufficient
that the mistake is one to which the
plaintiff by his acts has unintentionally
contributed.
In fact, the plaintiff's
connection with the mistake is not an
essential factor.
While it is well established doctrine that
equity will not enforce a contract when
the plaintiff contributed to or induced the
defendant's mistake or misapprehension, the
discretion of a court of equity to refuse
specific performance of a contract entered
into under mistake, it is not limited to
cases in which the mistake is induced or
made probable or possible by conduct, acts,
or ommissions of the plaintiff.
Even though the mistake is that of defendant

-11-
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or his agent and the plaintiff is neither
directly or indirectly responsible therefore, the Court may, and ordinarily will,
refuse a decree of specific performance
where the mistake is a material one and
the enforcement of the contract under the
circumstances would be inequitable or a
hardship to the defendant, particularly
where the plaintiff does not claim to
have changed his position before he was
notified of the mistake, or to have
suffered any loss by reason of having
entered into the contract.
In such cases,
the court is governed by the principle of
hardship and unfairness equally with that
of mistake."
"By reason of the above, the Court denies the
defendant specific performance of the option to purchase
the plaintiff's real property described in the lease
agreement dated June 27, 1974. Therefore, it is
unnecessary for the court to make a specific finding
as to whether a separate consideration was necessary
for the option.
(Emphasis added)
The court has cited its own authority for its finding
but there are additional authorities to be found which also
support the court's action,

81 C,J.S. at page 830,

Specific Performance Section 50, Subsection (a) reads:
Specific Performance will ordinarily be denied
if it is doubtful whether there has ever been a meeting
of the minds or a full and complete understanding of
all the essential terms of the contract sought to be
enforced, Specific Performance will also be denied
if a misunderstanding as to an important matter is
i
evident or the intention, as expressed, has not been . , r
understandingly formed because of mistake, misapprehensic.:
or misrepresentation as to a material matter, in the
'
absence of which the contract would not have

-12-
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been entered into. Since in determining specific
enforceability of a contract, a court of equity
acts on different principles than where cancelation
or reformation of a contract is sought, specific
performance may be denied even though there is no
such misunderstanding, fraud, or mistake as would
permit the contract to be canceled or reformed
(Emphasis added)
·
The clearest statement of this principle in case law
is found in Chambers vs, Livermore, 15 Mich. 381,

(1867),

in which the Michigan Court stated as follows:
Specific Performance, even of a binding
contract, is not a matter of right; and a court of
equity will refuse it, and turn the complainant over
to his remedy at law, if not clearly statisfied that
it embodies the real understanding of the parties.
At page 138.
In the case of Pope Manufacturing Company vs. Gormully,

144 U.S. 224, 36 L,ed 414 (1891) United States Supreme
Court based its affirmation of a denial of specific
performance on its determination that the defendant did
not understand the legal purport of the instrument which he
signed.

The court stated as follows:

••• Specific Performance is not an absolute right,
but one which rests entirely in judicial discretion,
exercised, it is true, according to the settled principles
of equity and not arbitrarily or capriciously, and always
with reference to the facts of the particular case.
(citing cases)
•• ,Indeed, the operation of these covenants upon
his ligitimate business was such that it is hardly
possible he could have understood their legal purport •...
We have not found it necessary to go into the details
of this testimony. While we are not satisfied that his
assent to the contract was obtained by any fraud or
misrepresentation or that the defendant should not be
bound by it to the extent to which it is valid at law,
we are clearly of the opinion that it is of such a character
that the plaintiff has no right to call upon a court of
equity to give it the relief it has sought to obtain in
this suit,
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2,

Appellants had failed to satisfactorily perfol'.1ll their

portion of the contract,
Professor Corbin, at Volume 5(a) page 301, Specific
Performance Section 1175 states:
In the case of a bilateral contract in which the
promised performances constitute an agreed exchange of
equivalence, one who has himself broken his promise in
some material respect cannot get a decree of specific
perfol'.TI\ance.
I

A court of equity, if it is to require a defendant to per'.:1
his contract with exactness and specificity, may ligitimately
require that the plaintiff to have perfol'.1lled his obligations
the same kind of exactness and specificity.

•,11:]

Recently the cour:I

which Appellant and Respondent are now before held in Fischer
vs, Johnson, 525 P,2d, 45 (1974) as follows:
But it is also true that Specific Performance is
a remedy of equity; and one who envokes it must have
clean hands in having done equity himself. That is, he
must take care to discharge his own duties under the
contract; and he cannot rely on any mere inconvenience
as an excuse for his failure to do so, Even if inconven· .
ience or difficulty is encountered, he must make an effor.t.I
to perform or tender performance, which manifests reasonai.'
diligence and a bonified desire to keep his own promises,
The lower court in the case now before this court made the foll:
finding of fact in paragraph 12 on page 6 of Findings of fact ;;:j
Conclusions of Law:
:

That defendants have not kept the terms of
the lease in that they have failed to pay lease
payments as due, water assessment charges due,
and property taxes defendants were required to pay
by the terms of the lease.
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The Malones having failed to perform with exactness
and good faith, the terms of the lease and option agreement.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to
require the Ottesons to specifically perform their covenants
and promises under the Lease and Option Agreement.
The appellants in their brief, point I, argue that
the parole evidence rule prevents the court from considering
anything but the "four corners of the written instrument"
in its determination of a defense to specific performance.
This is a complete misstatement of the law of specific
performance.
McNeil

In Free vs, Little (supra) and McNeil vs.

(supra) the Utah Supreme Court stated that

The right to specific performance depends
not upon hard fast rules according to which all
cases are to be decided, but each case is dependent
upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances.
(Emphasis added)
In

~hamber

vs. Livermore (supra) the same question was

presented to the court, resulting in the following comment
by that court:
Complainant however, insists that all the parole
proof introduced to show that the reservation was
agreed upon as alleged in the answer, was incompet7nt.
This objection is untenable, Without now approaching
the mooted question, whether a complainant can be
allowed to show by parole a mistake in a contract,
with a view to having it reformed and then enforced,

-15-
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it is sufficient for us to say there is no dispute
in the authorities that the mistake may be shown ~
parole, as a defense to specific performance of the
written instrument,
See 1 Lead.
Cas. in eq. 519
(Margi) Note, and cases cited.
The Trial court in its equity jurisdiction over the specific
performance of the option did properly consider the circumstanc"
··1

surrounding the contract and its execution and properly exercis€!
its discretion in denying specific performance.

POINT II

I
I

THE COURTS RULINGS WERE PROPERLY BASED
ON EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT AT TRIAL.

I

The tryer of fact may consider all of the facts and circ1Dst;
which may have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of an;·

I

witnesses' statement and is not bound to give equal credibilit;J
!

all witnesses.
1115 (1955),

Gittens vs. Lundber9:_, 3 Utah 2d., 392, 284 P.ld

j

The record on appeal including the trial transcri:1
I

shows the following which support the major findings of fact

j

made by the court:
a.

As to the age and heal th of the parties, the court

wao

!

present to see each party for itself and in addition, the folic•j
testimony appears.

Mr. Cassity asked (at trial transcript pac<

~16-
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I

43,) why Nellie Otteson had not accompanied Ara to the office
of Boyd Bunnell.

A.

She wasn't able to go.

Q.

Why not?

A,

Crippled up.

Q.

She has pretty much been an invalid for many years?

A.

Yes sir.

Not feeling well.

At trial transcript page 222 the following dialogue appears in
direct examination:

Q,

How is it, that you are taking care of your wife today
and yesterday?

A.

Well it is very hard work.

Q,

No, I am saying who takes care of her?

A.

My sister, Mrs. Collard.

Q,

And who took care of her yesterday?

A.

Mrs, Fox,

Q,

Relief Society President?

A,

Yes sir.

b.

Bearing on the finding of fact that Ara Otteson farmed

the 28 acres with his father and had been a farmer on the land for
his entire life time is the following dialogue appearing in the
trial transcript at page 41:
Q,

And is it true that on the 28.2 acres you had your home?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And that is where you and Mrs. Otteson reside?

A.

Yes,
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Q.

And is it true that over the years through inheritar.:,i
from your forebears that you obtained the title to

l;.i

property?
A.

Yes,

Q,

Now did you farm this ground for many years?

A.

Yes.

At page 56 of the trial transcript, appears the following:
Q,

Do you have any personal judgment - how many years
did you farm Mr, Otteson?

A.

Several years.

I farmed since about 30, 1930.

Q.

From 1930 to when.

A.

1972.

c.

As to the courts findings that plaintiffs did orally

agree to enter into a lease of the land to the defendants, the
following testimony appears beginning on the 11th line of page
41 of the trial transcript.
Q,

How long was it before that date that you first talle:
about the lease on the 28 acres or was it about that
time?

A.

It was in March.

About the 21st.

Q,

And who started talking about the lease?

A,

Malones.

-18-
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THE COURT:

Speak as loud as you can.

A.

Yes, sir,

Q.

And Mr. Otteson, will you tell us how that happened?
they come to you or did you go to them?

Did

Tell us what

happened?
A.

First started out.

Q.

Excuse me,

A.

They came to us about the lease.

Q,

In your home?

A.

Yes, sir,

Q.

Alright, did you ever offer to lease the property
to them before they came to you?

A.

No sir.

Q.

Alright, and they came down to your little mobile
home?

A.

Yes, sir,

Q,

And will you tell us what was said to the best of your
ability?

A.

They would like to lease the 28 acres.

Q,

And did you agree to do so?

A.

Yes, we talked it over.

Q,

And did you come to a decision that you were willing
to lease them the 28,2 acres?

A.

Yes sir.

Q,

How many conferences did you have between March and June
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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about your leasing them and them leasing from you tr.: I

i

28 acres?

I
A.

Several, I don't -

Q,

Do you know just how many?

A.

No.

d.

As to Mr. Otteson's hearing disability, the followir.:1

testimony appears beginning at the bottom of page 43 of the tr·,

I

'"I

transcript:
I

Q,

And when you got to Mr. Bunnell' s office, did You h-,J

'·1

occasion to have a conversation with Mrs. Malone, wit:I

I

Mr, Bunnell?

A.

Yes sir.

Q,

And could you hear?

A,

Not. No.

Q,

Why not?

A.

Didn't have any batteries for my hearing aid.

Q,

Why did you go see Mr. Bunnell if you couldn't
hear?

A.

Well I expected them every day but.

I ordered

new ones but didn't get them.
Q.

I see,

So when you got there, did, do you remember

anything that was said between Mr. Bunnell and Mrs.
Malone?
A,

'.I was introduced to Mr.

Bunnell.

Said would like to
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have a little service done.

Q,

Making out some papers.

Do you remember anything else during that meeting
which was said?

A.

Mrs, Malone done most of the talking, I didn't.

Q.

Did you hear what was said?

A,

Part of it, yes.

Q.

Part of it you heard?

A.

Very little,

Q.

Very little?

A.

Yes.

On page 45 beginning with the fourth line down is the following
dialogue regarding the meeting at Mr. Bunnell's office:

Q.

Did you at any time hear any mention of the word
option?

A,

No,

Q.

Never heard the word mentioned?

A.

Not at this meeting,

Q.

Now before you went to that meeting, had the word option
ever been mentioned by Mr. & Mrs, Malone or you and Mrs.
Otteson during the time you met in March to June, 1974?

A.

NO sir.

Q.

Never?

-21-
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A.

NO sir.

Q

Had Mr.

&

Mrs. Malone ever told you that in connectir-1

·1

leasing the property that they wanted to buy it?
A.

NO sir.

Q.

Or they wanted the right if they chose to buy it?

A.

No sir.

Q.

Absolutely not?

A.

That's right,

At page 114 the trial transcript on cross examination
of Boyd Bunnell reflects the following:
Q.

But in any case, Mr. Otteson did very little
to participate in the discussion?

A.

That is true.

e.

As to the court's finding that the respondents

at no time discussed sale or option to purchase with Mr.
Bunnell or the Malones, the trial transcript reflects
the following testimony of Mr, Bunnell at page 116,
last paragraph:
MR. CASSITY:
Q.

Just one further question in light of that, your
honor,

Mr. Bunnell, is it not true that you at no

time explained what option to buy as used in that

-22-
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agreement meant to Mr. and Mrs. Otteson?
A,

That is true.

With regard to the finding of the court that the Ottesons
understood the option as giving them a first right of refusal
rather than a straight option, the transcript beginning on
the bottom of page 46 contains the following testimony:

Q.

Was anyone else present when you tried to decide
what the option part of the lease said?

A.

No sir,

Q.

Or meant?

A,

No sir.

Q.

Just you and Mrs. Otteson?

A.

just the two of us.

(Omitted discussion between Court and Counsel for all parties)

Q.

Mr. Otteson, with regard to the option provision
of the lease, what did you intend that that would
give Mr. and Mrs. Malone?

A,

The right to run the farm. under the lease.
expect to have it, to sell
nothing about the option.

it.

We didn't

Nothing was said,

Never talked option. at

any time,
Q.

At any time?

A,

At any time,

Q.

Well did you ever discuss what the provision meant
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with Mr. and Mrs. Malone before you signed the lease:
A.

NO sir.

Q.

Did it ever occur to you that that provision might

~e:·

that if the Malones wanted to buy the property, thei·
could do so?
A.

No sir.

I never -understood it that way.

Q.

Well now, Mr. Otteson, did you and Nellie sign this
lease?

A.

Yes sir.

Q,

And you thought it was a five year lease?

A,

Yes sir.

(More discussion between counsel and court)
Q,

What right did you believe the option gave Mr. and
Mrs. Malone?

A.

The right to sell the place.

THE COURT:
A,

The right to what?

Sell the place,

THE COURT:

The right to sell the place did you say?

A.

Under the option the way I have been instructed now.

Q,

Who had the right to sell the place?

A,

We had the right to sell it.

r
•
·
·
between the cour'.
,Omitting
more material involving d iscussions

and counsel)
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1

Q.

Alright.

You said that you thought the option allowed

you to sell the place while the lease was going on, is
that right?
A.

After we got acquainted with the lease but we never
understood the option.

That we had to sell it at any

time or price,
At the beginning at the bottom of page 72 the trial transcript
demonstrates the following testimony:
Q.

Alright, then before you went over to Bunnell did you
then reach an agreement between you on what the terms
and conditions would be?

A.

On all but the option,

Q,

You claim the option wasn't discussed between you?

A.

Yes sir,

Q,

Is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

No time was it,

At page 85 the bottom paragraph, a portion of Mr, Ottesons
deposition is read into the record as follows:
Q.

Now this provision in here about the option and the

things we have discussed that is what you and Malones agreed to
is it not?
A,

Yes, partly.

Q.

Well what is the part you didn't agree to?

A.

Not to sell.

See we had no conversation about selling

that farm when he lease it.

None whatsoever.

At no

time no sale price was set,

Or not any agreement to

sell our farm.
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Q.

How do ym.i mean that that you didn't agree on any sa;,,
price but that you did discuss this option provision
that is in the lease, isn't that true?

A.

That's what

:r

say, we were friends and we trusted

them which there was nothing said about them buying
it until that option they put in the lease.
Then Mr, Cassity asked Mr. Otteson if this was his true
tesimony and he answered "that's true."
Again the trial transcript at page 225 5th line from the bottoc
I

states as follows:
Q.

Now when you talked about the lease with Mr. Malone
and Mrs. Malone, did they ever mention to you at any
time that they wanted to buy the land?

A.

Yes.

Q,

When?

A.

Well when they wanted to lease it.

Q.

What did you say?

A.

I told them no,

Q.

That you wouldn't sell the land?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And you told them at the very beginning?

A,

Yes sir.

Q,

Was there any further discussion about whether they

Both of them.

My wife too.
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1

could buy it after that first meeting?
A.

No sir.

Q.

Never again?

A.

Never again.

Q.

And not in the attorneys office that you are aware of?

A.

No sir,

On page 227 beginning at line 15 is the following dialogue:
Q.

Let me rephrase that,

Did you ever tell Mr. and Mrs.

Malone that they could buy your property?
A.

No sir.

Q,

Or that they could have an option to buy it at their
sole discretion?

A.

NO sir.

f.

With respect to the trial courts determination that

the defendants have not kept the terms of the lease, the
following testimony is present in the transcript beginning

10 lines from the bottom of page 63:
Q.

Did the lease require that Mr. Malone pay the water
assessment each year?

A.

Yes sir,

Q.

Did he pay it in 1976?

A,

No.

Q.

Did you?

A.

Yes sir.
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Q,

And in what amount?

A,

$184. 04.

Q.

Did you tell him that you had paid that water
assessment?

A,

He came down and I told him I paid it, yes.

Q.

Did you ask for the money back?

A.

No I didn't.

Q.

But under the terms of the lease, he owes it,
is that correct?

A,

That is right.

On page 131, Sue Malone, under direct examination stated that
the 1975 lease payment was tendered to the Ottesons but when
asked by her counsel ''Have you made any other payments?"
She responded "No sir.''.
In light of the above, the evidence before the trial
court was sufficient to support the trial courts findings.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFORMING THE LEASE AND OPTION BY ITS
VOIDING OF THE OPTION PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT.
The Appellants characterization of the law in Utah as
to the voiding, reformation or rescission of a con tract clear
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and unambiguous on its face, is substantially correct.
In 76 C,J.S. Reformation of Instruments Page 374 it
states as follows:
•.• But if the instrument does fail to express
the real agreement or transaction due either to
mutual mistake or to mistake, inadvertance, or accident
on one side, and fraud or inequitable conduct on the
other, and reformation is essential to give complete
legal effect to the instrument, it will be allowed.
(Emphasis added)
It is not clear to the Respondents according to Utah law
what other inequitable conduct on the other side would be
sufficient to allow reformation of a contract where inadvertance
of one party had resulted in the execution of an unambiguous contract.
Though by the authority cited by the Appellants, it is clear that
the Utah Court will countenance reformation if fraud is present.
The Appellants note that the trial court apparently dismissed
allegations that there was fraud or duress on the part of the
Malones,

Respondent points out to the court that such language

of the court was not at final disposition of the case, but
appears in the transcript to be slightly over one-half of the
way through the trial.

The court could have considered evidence

which was introduced in the second half of the trial weighed
with the evidence presented at the first half and come to a
different conclusion.

Given the relative age and infirmity

of the Respondents compared with the youthfulness

of the

-29-
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Appellants and given testimony produced at trial that an optior
to purchase or an outright sale of the land was never discussed between the parties and given all other circumstances
surrounding the execution of the lease and option, the
court may have concluded that there were sufficient inequities
to justify rescission or reformation of the contract.

Whether

this evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient, in
light of the wide discretion given the trial court, to
justify rescission or reformation under Utah Law is for this
court to decide.
As to the Appellants claim that Appellant was prejudiced
by the courts advising the parties to brief the question of
consideration supporting the option, the Respondents note
the final words of the trial court as they appear in the trial
transcript.

The last paragraph of page 231 reads as follows:

Okay, now I will take the case under advisement
and permit you as I said this morning, to submit
written memoranda on this question of the option.
But not only on that, gentlemen.
Feel free to discuss
the matter of damages, what each one of you think about
the question of damages,
Whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to damages or is not on the other side. !
mean go into any issue that you think is relevant and
imeor~.
And give the court the bene~f your view.
(Emphasis added)
The court was clearly not limiting the issues which Appell~t
could argue and no prejudice could have resulted to the Appell~:
by the submission and argument of points of law which the triai
court did not consider determinative.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court had before it in live presence
the parties involved in the case, along with testimony
showing the unequal capacity of the parties, the execution
of agreement whose meaning and effect Nas not apparent
to the Respondents, the less than perfect performance of
the obligations of the lease and option by the Appellants
and no intent of the Respondents to sell or alienate
their property,

With these facts in evidence, the

trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion
in denying specific performance to the Appellants.

To

require the Ottesons to sell their family farm under such
conditions would deny the trial courts responsibility to
do equity.

The rulings of the lower court should be

upheld accordingly.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1978.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

/

/! ~'

// - - - - - -

/'Ti ~/~
DONNIE, - d'.fs~

J.;STEVEN NEWTON
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY
Attorneys for Respondents
136 South Main Street
suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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